Carry every defect from crash to demonstrated command, so institutions know precisely what an adversary can do to them.
Independent Security Research & Advisory
Engineering Crash To Command.
We find the vulnerabilities in the systems you depend on, and prove exactly what they let an attacker do.
[00:00.000]
Execution Trace ● Live
/01 The Problem
Every System
Fails.
Most crashes are never explained.
One malformed input in tens of thousands crashes the target. That crash points straight to the flaw.
Corpus · Fuzzing Campaign
SIGSEGV · rip = 0x41414141
12, 409
Malformed Inputs
→
1
That Matters
/02 The Practice
Three Lines
Of Work.
01
Research & Assurance
Zero-day discovery, exploit development and product assurance.
02
Adversary Operations
Red and purple team work measured against objectives achieved.
03
Advisory & Vetting
Defensible risk positions, and independent vetting of the technology you are asked to trust.
/03 The Approach
From A Crash To A Command Position.
01Crashrip = 0x41414141 · SIGSEGV
02DefectHeap Overflow · parse_len()
03ControlArbitrary Write · 8 Bytes
04ChainASLR Defeated · CFI Bypassed
05CommandObjective Held · PoC Ready
Five Technical States · Eight Execution Stages From Target To Disclosure.
/04 The Standard
Proof Over
Volume.
The independent check a security claim has to pass before you rely on it.
Demonstration Over Assertion
Independence By Structure
Scope Honesty
Built For Scrutiny
/05 Command
Crash to Command.
Tell us the decision you have to take. We will tell you what evidence it needs, and whether we are the right people to produce it.
Start A Conversation/06 The Firm
We Prove What
Hardened Systems
Actually Withstand.
The research that settles whether a security claim holds up against a real attacker.
Independent Research.
Defensible Decisions.
Most firms do one or the other. Trace0 conducts original vulnerability research at source and binary level, and delivers the advisory that follows from it to boards and regulators. Neither half is subcontracted, and the practitioner who found the defect is the one who explains what it means.
Mission
Vision
A market in which no security claim about a consequential system is trusted until someone has tried breaking it.
Purpose
Put evidence, not assertion, behind the decisions that matter most.
Philosophy
We answer the one question a severity score can't: whether it can actually be exploited, and how far.
/07 Our Services
One Foundation.
Three Pillars.
Vulnerability research supplies the evidence. The pillars above it convert that evidence into assurance, advice and procurement decisions.
A
Research & Assurance
Discovery, exploitability, design assurance, AI systems.
B
Advisory & Governance
Risk posture, prioritisation, board and regulator reporting.
C
Products & Placement
Independent vetting, vetted list, technology placement.
Ten Lines Of WorkSource · Binary · Firmware · Container · Model Artefacts
01Vulnerability ResearchFuzzing, crash triage, root cause, exploitability, zero-day work across parsers, protocol stacks, kernels and firmware.
02Exploit DevelopmentPrimitive construction, mitigation bypass and N-day reconstruction. A working primitive resolves disputes a severity score cannot.
03Product AssuranceVendor claim validation, hidden functionality, backdoor and implant analysis, undeclared data movement.
04Red & Purple TeamAdversary emulation measured against objectives achieved, with detection engineering tuned in the same engagement.
05Offensive SecurityWeb, API, mobile, thick client and network assessment, directed by each system's own trust model.
06Design AssuranceArchitecture, trust models, cryptography and key management, design reviews, gates and assurance cases.
07Cloud SecurityEntitlement review, control-plane exposure, tenant and workload isolation across cloud platforms.
08AI & ML SecurityAgent authority, instruction integrity, data provenance, model supply chain and AI risk governance.
09Strategic AdvisoryA defensible ordering of risk, framed for board and oversight review, retained or project-based.
10Vetted Products & PlacementIndependent evaluation, vetted list access, supply and placement of security technology.
/08 Our Methodology
Walk A Crash
To A Finding.
Every state is engineered from the one before it and demonstrated in code against the system as it ships. Effort is placed where the target is weakest, not spread evenly across it.
01
Target Selection
Attack surface enumerated, then reduced to the code reachable from untrusted input and worth an adversary's effort.
02
Reverse Engineering · where most engagements are won or abandoned
Stripped firmware, proprietary protocols, obfuscated binaries and custom silicon are recovered through static analysis, emulation and instrumented execution.
03
Instrumentation & Audit
Coverage-guided fuzzing and sanitizer builds carry the paths that automate; manual audit carries state machines, parsers and crypto handling.
04
Root Cause & Variant Analysis
Every defect traced to the precise flaw and the design decision that permitted it, then the bug class hunted across the codebase.
05
Exploit Development
Primitives are constructed, not asserted, against the shipping configuration, defeating ASLR, CFI, allocator hardening and signing.
06
Chain Construction
Primitives composed into a path to an operational objective; the chain reveals which single control collapses it.
07
Adversary Simulation
Chains exercised against production configuration, through a real delivery path, under the monitoring the environment actually runs.
08
Impact & Disclosure
Findings placed in operational context, what an adversary gains, what it costs, what remediation is proportionate, with disclosure managed to conclusion.
/09 Contact
Start A
Conversation.
Tell us the decision you have to take. We will tell you what evidence it needs, and whether we are the right people to produce it.
contact@trace0.ai- contact@trace0.ai
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- lab.trace0.ai ↗
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